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ABSTRACT
Risk is an integral part of financial intermediation. Hence, risk management must be at the heart 
of finance. However, it is disturbing to note that systematic risk management is still not as widespread 
as it should be in the microfinance industry. Except for a few flagship microfinance institutions (MFIs), 
which constitute the core of the industry, most MFIs do not pay adequate attention to systematic risk 
management.
The microfinance industry has grown rapidly during the last decade in breadth, depth, and scope 
of outreach. The rapid growth seems to continue, given the massive unserved and underserved market. 
The growth of the industry has changed the risk profile of MFIs. Yet many MFIs seem to continue to 
seek growth without much attention to attendant risks. Surprisingly, many MFIs appear to neglect even 
the basic credit risk management which helped MFIs achieve high growth rates historically.
The growing interest of many MFIs in agricultural microfinance must be seen in the broader 
context of risk management in the industry. Financing agriculture is more risky than financing trade 
or industry; it is also more risky than financing nonagricultural microenterprises. However, MFIs 
interested in agricultural microfinance should be more concerned about their internal structures and 
capabilities rather than the widely discussed, and often cited, pervasive risks in agriculture and their 
ramifications for the MFIs’ pursuit of growth in agricultural microfinance.
MFIs should recognize the inherent risks in agriculture. However, if they build their institutional 
capacity to effectively deal with risks generally associated with financial services for poor and low-
income households, their prospects for success in agricultural microfinance would certainly be much 
brighter. In addition, no amount of sophisticated and modern technical tools and analysis can help 
achieve effective risk management in respect of nonagricultural or agricultural microfinance if risk 
management is not embedded into the institutional culture and its value is not shared by all employees. 
Achieving this goal remains one of the most challenging tasks in risk management which MFIs need to 
address. To help in this effort, we need to bring into the discussion—now dominated largely by issues 
related to introducing sophisticated systems and technical tools of risk management—the institutional 
cultural issues and issues related to cognitive biases in executive decision-making behavior.    2 Asian Journal of Agriculture and Development, Vol. 4, No. 2
INTRODUCTION
The breadth, depth, and scope of outreach of 
the microfinance industry have grown significantly 
during the last two decades. The Asia and Pacific 
region accounts for the bulk of this growth. 
According to the Microcredit Summit Campaign 
(2006:24), by 31 December 2005, some 3,133 
microcredit institutions reported reaching 113.26 
million clients with a current loan, and about 97 
million of these clients were in the Asia and Pacific 
region. Of the total number of clients reached by 
these institutions, about 82 million were among the 
poorest when they started with the program, and 
91% or about 74 million of the poorest families 
reported are in Asia where over two-thirds of 
the world’s poor people live. The erstwhile 
microenterprise-credit-only institutions are now 
providing a broader range of credit products. 
Their loans are no longer confined to short-term 
working capital loans but now also include loans 
with relatively longer maturities, and those intended 
for other purposes such as acquiring fixed assets.   
Some microfinance institutions (MFIs) even 
venture into the financing of agricultural operations. 
Other MFIs have expanded their deposit services, 
thus contributing to the expansion of the scope of 
outreach. Grameen Bank, for example, has achieved 
impressive results in mobilizing voluntary savings 
through its new deposit products offered under the 
Grameen Pension Scheme to the members, and 
other deposit products offered to both members 
and nonmembers (Rutherford 2006). 
The last two decades have also seen a significant 
increase in the diversity of institutions providing 
financial services to the poor and low-income 
households. The previous predominance of non-
government organizations (NGO) in the retail 
markets of many countries has been challenged 
by new developments such as the transformation 
of some pioneering NGOs into fully or partially 
regulated financial entities, the emergence of 
specialized microfinance banks, the entry of 
commercial banks into microfinance, and the 
increased involvement of cooperatives and rural 
banks. The increasing involvement of nonfinancial 
institutions such as telecommunication companies 
in microfinance is adding to this diversity. 
One  of  the  significant  changes  in  the 
microfinance industry has been the growth in 
commercial and semi-commercial borrowings, 
including loans denominated in foreign currency 
to finance operations. According to Abrams 
and Stauffenberg (2007, p. 1), in the last three 
years, the volume of international private lending 
for microfinance has exploded: in 2005 alone, 
outstanding loans doubled to nearly $1 billion. 
Structured finance transactions are also becoming 
important in the microfinance market. In 2006, 
Bangladeshi MFI BRAC securitized the $180 
million equivalent of its portfolio.
As will be shown later, although MFIs and the 
industry have suffered serious setbacks in some 
countries, the industry has been relatively stable 
in most countries. A number of institutions such as 
BRAC and the Association for Social Advancement 
in Bangladesh, the SKS Microfinance and Spandana 
in India, and the Compartamos in Mexico have 
managed to sustain their growth rates remarkably 
well without sacrificing portfolio quality. The 
incredible resilience of the industry was illustrated 
during the Asian financial crisis in the late 1990s 
and the aftermath of the tsunami which struck Asia 
in 2005. However, it must be recognized that the 
changes in markets, products and services, delivery 
models, and technology used in the industry have 
had, and continue to have, profound implications 
on the overall risk profile of the industry over time. 
MFIs or others which provide microfinance services 
can no longer afford to focus only on credit and 
liquidity risks and consider other types of risk on 
an ad hoc basis, often in a reactive manner. Risks 
in microfinance must be managed in a systematic 
manner and the importance of risk management will 
further increase as the industry matures further and 
microfinance markets become more competitive 
(Powers 2005).
This paper briefly outlines the different 
categories of risks that MFIs face and discusses what 
type of risks are becoming more important, why 
there is greater need for risk management now than 
before, and what has been the industry experience, 
so far, in microfinance risk management. The paper 
also outlines some principles for risk management 
in microfinance, in general, and in agricultural 
microfinance, in particular. The main objective 3 Nimal A. Fernando
of the paper is to further advance the discussions 
related to microfinance risk management including 
that of agricultural microfinance; the recommended 
tools and techniques for use by MFIs is not meant 
to be a comprehensive discussion.
For the purposes of this paper, microfinance 
risk is defined broadly as ”the potential for events 
or ongoing trends to cause future losses or declines 
in future income of an MFI or deviate from the 
original social mission of an MFI.” We have 
included the deviation of the social mission in our 
definition because such deviation can occur without 
necessarily causing losses or declines in future 
income and, in our view, the risk of mission drift 
is one of the most significant risks in microfinance. 
This is not considered part of the risk profile of 
conventional financial institutions because they do 
not have a social mission.
CATEGORIES 
OF MICROFINANCE RISK
At the initial stages of growth in the microfinance 
industry, most MFIs were concerned only about 
financial risks. Even in the financial risk category, 
their focus was almost exclusively on credit 
risk. When the demand for loans began to rise 
exponentially, MFIs also began to be concerned 
about a particular type of liquidity risk wherein 
the MFIs would run out of enough cash to meet 
the demand for loans. The industry evolution has 
brought additional risks. In a publication released 
in 2000, Deutsche Gesellschaft für Technische 
Zusammenarbeit (GTZ) cited three major risk 
categories: financial, operational, and strategic. 
GTZ also listed subcategories of risk under each 
main category. More recently, Churchill and 
Frankiewicz (2006) listed four risk categories, 
namely: institutional risks, operational risks, 
financial management risks, and external risks. As 
shown in Table 1, they also identify subcategories 
of risks in each primary category.  
RECENT CHANGES 
IN MICROFINANCE RISK PROFILE 
As the industry evolved over the last two 
decades, the profile of microfinance risk has 
changed. Traditionally identified risks, such 
as credit and liquidity risks, have increased in 
intensity. And additional risks in such areas as 
social mission, foreign exchange, competition, and 
system integrity have surfaced and are assuming 
greater importance. Some of these risks seem to 
be less-known and have yet to receive the attention 
they deserve from MFI managers.
Many people agree that the initial success of 
MFIs can be largely attributed to the management 
of credit risks. Successful MFIs have managed 
to maintain high levels of loan recovery rates, 
generally over 95%. These remarkably high loan 
recovery ratios triggered the initial wave of donor 
funds and the subsequent inflow from a variety of 
social investors which they could use to expand 
their operations. While many successful MFIs 
continue to contain credit risks within desired 
levels, they face greater challenges than before 
as indicated by the increased volatility of their 
portfolio at risk (PAR) ratios. The sources of these 
challenges include the increased competition in 
the market, the addition of new credit products 
with longer-term structures, the shift to individual 
lending, the increased scale of operations, and the 
geographical expansion and efforts to deepen the 
outreach. 
Credit risk also has other dimensions. Initially, 
microfinance credit risk was assumed to have been 
confined almost entirely to risk associated with 
the possible default by borrowers of MFIs. This 
is reflected in the definition of credit risk as “the 
risk to earnings or capital due to borrowers’ late 
and nonpayment of loan obligations.” However, 
a broader definition of credit risk also includes 
the risk of default by other financial institutions, 
which have payment obligations to MFIs (Bruett 
2004). This is particularly true with respect of MFIs 
which continue as NGOs. Such payment obligations 
may arise because MFIs use those institutions as 
depository institutions, investment outlets, or for 
money transfers. Also, such risks may arise due 
to the agency services that MFIs provide to other 
financial institutions. MFIs suffer losses when 
these institutions are unable or unwilling to meet 
their payment obligations. However, MFIs tend to 
overlook this dimension of credit risk although it is 
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the National Bank (central bank) of Cambodia 
suspended the license of the Farmers’ Bank in 
1997, the bank ceased operations and ACLEDA 
(which was an NGO-MFI at the time) was not able 
to recover $267,932 that it held on account with the 
Farmers’ Bank (Clark 2006, p.101). Similarly, a 
number of cooperative rural banks in Sri Lanka lost 
access to their deposits when a commercial bank 
that held a significant amount of their deposits ran 
into difficulties and its accounts were frozen and 
operations were suspended by the central bank. 
Credit risks are more acute today than in the early 
stages for those MFIs which have accumulated a 
significant amount of reserves, part of which in turn 
is kept in other financial institutions in the form of 
deposits or investments.
Aside from generally recognized default risks 
by clients, another type of credit risk arises when 
MFI clients deposit their savings in other financial 
institutions which are weak and not covered by a 
credible deposit protection scheme. Clients may 
not have ready access to their funds and thus lose 
a source of loan repayment for their MFI loan 
if the bank where they keep their deposits runs 
into difficulties (Bruett 2004). In such cases, loan 
recovery rates may suddenly fall.
Another risk whose importance has grown 
significantly in recent years is the foreign exchange 
risk. About five years ago, very few MFIs borrowed 
in foreign currency because they relied largely on 
donor grants and long-term concessional loans 
given in local currency through national apex 
agencies or such other mechanisms. However, 
foreign currency loans now constitute an important 
source of financing for the loan capital requirements 
of an increasing number of MFIs—most notably 
the dynamic, better-performing ones. A recent 
survey by the Consultative Group to Assist the 
Poor (CGAP 2006, p.1) estimated that of a total of 
$1.2 billion in foreign investment in MFIs, $750 
million is debt capital and at least 92% of this 
debt capital is in hard currency. Some MFIs also 
mobilize deposits in foreign currency. These foreign 
currency loans and deposits create foreign exchange 
risks for those MFIs whose principal assets 
are microloans denominated in local currency. 
Devaluation of the local currency in relation to the 
foreign currency may generate substantial losses 
to an MFI. Devaluation, however, is not the only 
possible source of foreign exchange risks. The 
MFI with foreign currency loans are also exposed 
to convertibility and transfer risks. In these cases, 
MFIs may have the financial capacity to make their 
foreign currency payments, but may not be able to 
do so because of national government restrictions or 
prohibitions on making foreign currency available 
for sale or transferring foreign currency outside the 
country (CGAP 2006). 
Interest rate risks have also grown in importance 
in recent years. The partial shift in borrowing 
from commercial or semi-commercial sources 
at fixed rates of interest to variable interest rates 
has contributed to this. At the early stages, when 
MFIs borrowed funds, such borrowings consisted 
almost entirely of fixed interest rate loans. Given 
that variable rates are likely to rise while MFI loans 
are mostly at fixed interest rates, and considering 
the difficulty of making upward adjustments in 
microcredit interest rates, the variable interest rates 
on debt capital generally expose MFIs to potentially 
greater interest rate risks. 
Mission drift risk has also increased with 
the maturity of the industry. While the increased 
commercialization of an MFI operation does not 
necessarily mean that it will move away from its 
original social mission to provide services to the 
unserved and underserved poor, MFIs are now 
under tremendous pressure to move upmarket 
given the changes in markets and ownership, and 
the greater internal and external pressure to achieve 
reasonably high level of returns on equity. Such 
movements, which could occur in lending as well as 
in deposit services, can potentially be at the expense 
of the services to the original target groups. 
Many MFIs are also now subject to greater 
operational risk than before due to a number of 
factors. First, some MFIs have become regulated 
financial institutions and therefore, subject to 
regulatory and compliance risk. Second, most MFIs 
have expanded their geographical coverage and 
their operational areas include those more prone 
to calamities, security problems, and other such 
risks. Some types of operational risks generally 
increase with distance from the head office, and 
control difficulties are more pronounced at branches 
located in remote areas. Furthermore, the employees 
in these areas are more likely to remain in the 
same positions for too long—a situation that can 
potentially create other complications. Third, the 
scale of cash operations of most MFIs has increased 6 Asian Journal of Agriculture and Development, Vol. 4, No. 2
and many MFI staff members have easy access 
to the cash resources. Fourth, many MFIs have 
increased their reliance on new information and 
communication technology. MFIs face operational 
risk whenever this technology malfunctions or 
breaks down. In addition, technological investments 
expose MFIs to technology risk which occurs when 
these investments do not produce the anticipated 
cost savings in economies of scale or scope, or do 
not result in anticipated increases in revenue. 
The importance of liquidity risks has also 
grown owing to a number of reasons. First, the 
average term structure of loans has increased in 
most MFIs because of increases in loan sizes, 
introduction of new loan products with longer 
maturities, and other related factors. Second, the 
demand for loans continues to grow at high rates. 
Third, short-term liabilities seem to have increased 
in importance in the liability structure. Thus, some 
MFIs are funding medium- to long-term loans 
with relatively short-term liabilities which consist, 
among others, of passbook savings. 
Two other types of risk have assumed greater 
importance in the microfinance industry in recent 
years. These are the competition risks and political 
risks. The competition risks have increased—a 
natural outcome of the growing level of competition 
in the market as the industry matures over time. 
Although some early entrants have consolidated 
their position in the market and continue as 
market leaders, they have lost their near-monopoly 
position to new players. In some countries such 
as the Philippines, the new players include 
nonfinancial institutions like telecommunication 
companies, while in some others they include 
incumbent commercial banks and new nonbank 
financial institutions. The competition has made 
client retention more difficult. In Bolivia, market 
competition significantly affected the niche market 
players such as BancoSol in the late 1990s and led 
to significant operational and financial problems. 
MFIs also face much greater political risks than 
before. Such risks, ironically, appear to be greater 
for the leading MFIs which follow sustainable 
growth paths. In a number of countries, populist 
governments have imposed or attempted to impose 
interest rate caps on microcredit (CGAP 2004; 
Fernando 2006). High interest rates charged by 
MFIs to achieve financial sustainability have 
come under increasing criticisms from politicians 
in countries such as Bangladesh, Cambodia, India, 
and Sri Lanka in recent years. Politicians make 
repeated requests to some leading MFIs to provide 
debt forgiveness to borrowers in distress and reduce 
interest rates on microcredit. In some countries, 
the central or local governments have introduced 
new subsidized microcredit schemes. Politicians 
are also increasingly questioning the need to 
continue granting tax exemptions to NGO-MFIs 
which make profits. These factors together indicate 
greater potential political risks than before for the 
microfinance industry, in general, and the leading 
MFIs, in particular. Rhyne and Otero (2006, p. 57) 
predict the greater prominence of political risks in 
the next decade, as microfinance grows further and 
becomes more visible.
Another risk that has gained more importance 
in recent years is the reputation risk. Among 
other factors, the increase in regulatory burden 
has contributed to this. Reputation is critically 
important for MFIs of all types. MFIs with a strong 
positive reputation can attract better staff and more 
clients and maintain customer loyalty. They can 
market their services at lower costs and expand their 
geographic coverage relatively easily. In addition, 
relative to those with less solid reputations, these 
MFIs can have better access to larger amount 
of funds from various sources, including social 
investors and semi-commercial and commercial 
sources.
RISKS  IN 
AGRICULTURAL MICROFINANCE
Agriculture is widely considered to be 
inherently more risky than industry or trade because 
it is more easily, directly, frequently, and severely 
affected by such factors as inclement weather, 
pests, diseases, and other natural calamities. The 
poorer farmers suffer disproportionately from 
these than the nonpoor. Returns in agriculture are 
not only more volatile but also generally much 
lower than those in most commercial and nonfarm 
microenterprises. Hence agricultural microfinance 
is more risky than agricultural finance in general 
and non-agricultural microfinance in particular. 
Agricultural microfinance, for example, becomes 
more risky when the agricultural activities of poor 
farmers are concentrated in specific geographic 
locations, thereby resulting in high covariant risks 7 Nimal A. Fernando
that make localized MFIs more vulnerable to local 
disasters. If poor households are engaged in the 
monoculture of crops, they pose greater risks of 
vulnerability. In addition to these, poor farmers 
face greater market and price risks than the nonpoor 
because of their relative inability to mitigate such 
risks. In some countries, government-operated crop 
and livestock insurance schemes exist to protect 
the small and marginal farmers, among others. 
However, in practice, such schemes do not protect 
these groups due to a variety of reasons. Also, if 
poor farmers do not own the land they cultivate and 
rely on share tenancy, the lenders to such farmers 
tend to face greater risks.
Other factors make agricultural microfinance 
more risky. Many agricultural activities may require 
relatively longer-term loans than microenterprises 
although poor farm households may not have the 
ability to make frequent repayments due to their 
cash-flow pattern dictated by the cropping cycle. 
The precision of crop schedules and the need 
to use inputs in a systematic manner to achieve 
optimum returns from those inputs also add to the 
risks in agricultural finance (CGAP 2005a, p.3). 
For example, if planting is not done at the right 
time or fertilizer-responsive varieties are not used 
together with fertilizer as required, the farmers may 
not achieve the desired results and thus be unable to 
generate the surpluses needed to meet debt service 
requirements. Or farmers may simply resort to 
higher-risk, higher-return cropping strategies in 
their pursuit of higher incomes (CGAP 2005a, p. 2). 
In general, information asymmetries may be greater 
for poor farm households than microenterprise 
operators, thus contributing to higher credit risks 
for agricultural microfinance.
 MFIs financing agriculture may also run greater 
political risks because of the greater tendency of 
politicians to identify small and marginal farmers as 
an important constituency to achieve their political 
and social objectives. Politicians are, for example, 
more likely to push for  debt forgiveness for poor 
and marginal farmers than for microenterprise 
operators. Similarly, they are more likely to promise 
heavily subsidized government microcredit for 
poor farmers than other economically active poor 
households.
Scope diversification generally reduces the 
overall risks faced by a financial institution. 
However, this is true only if the diversification 
results in the addition of relatively less risky 
operations. Because agricultural microfinance, 
as pointed out above, is a relatively more risky 
operation for a typical MFI, it may be logical to 
conclude that in general agricultural microfinance 
increases the overall risks the MFIs face. Therefore, 
if an MFI is planning to add agricultural finance to 
its existing scope of operations, one can generally 
expect it to face a greater overall level of risk than 
before.
Although agricultural activities are risky, 
financing poor households which are engaged in 
agricultural activities may pose lesser risks if the 
sources of their household income are sufficiently 
diversified. Thus, from a risk point of view, we need 
to recognize that there is a subtle difference between 
microfinance for agriculture and microfinance for 
the agricultural operations of poor households with 
diversified sources of income.
 
THE INDUSTRY EXPERIENCE 
WITH LOSSES 
There is a dearth of information and data 
on losses incurred by MFIs due to the absence 
of comprehensive risk management systems. 
However, available anecdotal and other evidences 
tend to indicate the various instances when many 
MFIs, including some flagship institutions, suffered 
significant losses due to insufficient attention to risk 
management. This is illustrated in the following 
examples: 
ACLEDA’s1 1996 liquidity crisis
As ACLEDA’s business expanded much more 
rapidly than the capital available to finance the 
growing portfolio, a liquidity crisis developed. 
The list of prospective borrowers lengthened, with 
waiting time to borrow reaching three months 
and then growing further to six months. With 
little excess liquidity in any branch and the great 
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owing to the dangerous terrain, ACLEDA began 
to disburse only as much as it collected daily from 
borrowers, making installment payments in each 
branch. ACLEDA’s portfolio growth rates, which 
hit an all-time high mid-year, decreased throughout 
the last seven months of 1996. Lending capital 
for small enterprise loans—the largest share of 
the portfolio—decreased most. Recently opened 
branches were unable to expand their operations 
and ACLEDA had to put on hold opening new 
branches until additional funding could be found 
(Clark 2006, pp. 98–99).
Serious delinquency crisis of 2001 at ACLEDA
 In 2001, in 11 mature branches, the aggregate 
write-off in the case of microloan portfolio 
increased to 10.20% from 4.02% in the previous 
year and, in the case of small loan portfolio, to 
5.50% from 2.52% also in the previous year. In two 
of these branches both the PAR over 30 days and 
write-off rates in respect of microlending exceeded 
20%. Detailed data revealed that four branches 
accounted for 72% of the total delinquency in the 
microcredit portfolio (Box 1).





organizations in Cambodia which required payment of both principal and interest only at the end of the 
loan	term.	Although	ACLEDA’s	product	was	relatively	less	risky,	it	still	involved	a	great	deal	of	risk.	Unlike	
a	loan	with	regular	installments	of	principal	and	interest,	a	repayment	schedule	of	a	balloon	loan	does	little	























portfolio at the end of the year. The quest for rapid growth and heavy reliance on new and inexperience 
staff	were	also	major	factors	for	the	crisis.	However,	in-depth	analysis	of	the	crisis	confirmed	that	the	
deteriorating portfolio quality was primarily a management issue: one that was exacerbated by agricultural 
lending and the balloon loan.
Note:	Reproduced	from	Clark	(2006,	pp.	204–208)9 Nimal A. Fernando
Delinquency crisis at NWTF2  from 1992 to 
1994
Loan collection rate dropped to 87.2% in 1992 
from 95.1% a year ago and the PAR increased 
from 6.8% to16.3%. The number of active clients 
dropped to 2,950 in 1994 from 6,340 in 1992. It 
took nearly five years for NWTF to recover from 
this crisis (Chan 2003).
Liquidity crisis at NWTF
At one time, NWTF also faced a severe 
liquidity crisis because of deficiencies in demand 
projections. NWTF did not have adequate funds to 
meet the demand for loans and had to ration credit 
and deal with discontented clients.
Delinquency crisis at the Center for Community 
Transformation (CCT)3  in 1998
CCT was a small MFI in the Philippines, 
with plans for growth. In 1998, CCT experienced 
a serious delinquency crisis. The PAR exceeded 
16% and the number of active clients declined 
substantially.
PROSHIKA’s delinquency crisis
PROSHIKA, one of the major MFIs in 
Bangladesh, has been experiencing a severe crisis 
since its PAR (over 30 days) increased from 6.0% 
in 1999 to 15.0% in 2000 and 18.0% in 2001. The 
PAR was brought down to 9.03% in 2002 but 
increased again to 14.75% in 2003 and 24.49% in 




in Bank Dagang Bali (Indonesia)
This bank was considered one of the most 
successful microfinance intermediaries in the region 
and had a history of over two decades of successful 
operations. This family-owned bank was not able 
to comply with the regulatory requirements of 
Bank Indonesia (the Central Bank) in the early 
2004 and had serious liquidity problems due to bad 
management and poor governance. The Central 
Bank liquidated it in 2004.
Political crisis in microfinance 
in Andhra Pradesh in India in 2006
A major crisis broke out in March 2006 for 
MFIs in this state when the authorities in the 
Krishna district closed down about 50 branches of 
two major MFIs in the district. The chief minister 
of the State said that the MFIs were exploiting the 
poor through exorbitant interest rates and unethical 
means of loan recovery. The affected MFIs were 
able to open the closed branches after some time 
(Shylendra 2006, p. 1959).
Delinquency crisis at K-Rep in 19974
K-Rep, a flagship MFI in Kenya, experienced 
a rapid growth in its loan portfolio during the 
1991–96 period. And K-Rep’s PAR (over 30 days) 
increased from 5.0% in 1995 to 18.3% in 1997. 
Although K-Rep brought its PAR down to 2.74% 
by the end of 2002, it has shown an increasing trend 
since then. The ratio had increased to 9.42% by the 
end of 2005 (www.mixmarket.org).
Crisis at Finansol in 1995–1996
Finansol was a regulated microfinance company 
in Colombia. From 1995 to 1996, it ran into serious 
liquidity and capital inadequacy problems (among 
many other problems) due to poor governance, 
fraud, and a sharp fall in loan collection (Box 2). 
Bolivia’s microfinance industry crisis 
during 1998–2000
During the 1996–98 period, Bolivia experienced 
an oversupply of microcredit mainly due to 
excessively aggressive growth strategies that a 
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number of consumer loan companies adopted. This 
led to serious over-indebtedness among borrowers 
of MFIs. Among the severely affected MFIs was 
BancoSol (Rhyne 2001). As a result of the crisis, the 
number of active borrowers of BancoSol decreased 
from 81,553 at the end of 1997 to 50,904 at the 
end of 2002 and its PAR over 30 days increased 
from 3.03% in 1998 to 9.58% in 2000 and 10.16% 
in 2001. This crisis also severely affected another 
MFI, Prodem.
RISK MANAGEMENT
Risk management is the process of controlling 
the likelihood and potential severity of an adverse 
event: it is about systematically identifying, 
measuring, limiting, and monitoring risks faced 
by an institution. Risk management is important 
simply because “risk…pervades finance as gravity 
pervades physics” and to “survive and prosper in 
financial markets, participants must manage risk 
in ways that increase their wealth” (Von-Pischke 
1991, p. 25). Risk management strategies attempt 
to address risk ex ante. 
An MFI may adopt certain elements of 
risk management although it may not have a 
comprehensive risk management system. According 
to the Federal Reserve Bank (quoted in GTZ 2000, 
p. 5), comprehensive risk management includes 
practices designed to limit risk associated with 
individual product lines and systematic, quantitative 
methods to identify, monitor, and control aggregate 
risks across a financial institution’s activities 
and products. A comprehensive approach to 
risk management reduces the risk of loss, builds 
credibility in the market place, and creates new 
opportunities for growth (GTZ 2000, p. 5). Because 
effective risk management ensures institutional 
sustainability and facilitates growth, it has 
significant implications for MFIs with a social 
mission to serve an increasing number of poor 
households. 
With the increasing level of maturity in the 
industry, many microfinance stakeholders seem 
to realize more now, than was the case about 10 
years ago, that risk management is at the heart of 
the microfinance industry as it is in the broader 
banking industry. If an MFI is keen to continue its 
operations, it must take risk management seriously 
and put in place systematic measures for the 
purpose. However, it appears that comprehensive 
risk management has not yet become the norm in 
the microfinance industry of most countries. 
The Industry Experience 
with Risk Management
The microfinance industry in most countries 
has an NGO origin. This factor seems to largely 
explain why many MFIs have not adequately 
incorporated risk management systems and 
procedures in their organizations. In addition, the 
excessive reliance of many, if not most MFIs, on 
grants and external concessional funds (including 
those provided by numerous government agencies) 
has also contributed to the inadequate importance 
given to risk management in the microfinance 
industry. 
Box 2. Corposol/finansol crisis
Corposol,	a	microfinance	institution	in	Colombia,	acquired	a	commercial	finance	company,	Finansol,	in	1993	
and	adopted	an	aggressive	growth	strategy.	Corposol	had	majority	ownership	in	Finansol	which	issued	
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Recent changes in the industry landscape—
particularly the prevalence of more market-
oriented approaches; the increased level of industry 
maturity; and the requirements and concerns 
of financial regulators and supervisors, donors, 
international microfinance networks, social and 
commercial investors, and microfinance rating 
companies—have driven an increasing number of 
MFIs to pay more attention to risk management than 
in the past. However, as GTZ (2000, p. 7) noted, 
although many MFIs have grown rapidly, serving 
more customers and larger geographic areas, and 
offering a wider range of financial services and 
products, “their internal risk management systems 
are often a step or two behind the scale and scope 
of their activities.” 
Although reliable data and information are 
not available to support the claim, this may be 
an understatement of the inadequacy of risk 
management in the microfinance industry. A more 
accurate statement may be that many MFIs are 
many steps behind in risk management relative to 
the scale, scope, nature, and complexity of their 
activities and the market environment in which 
they operate.
Most MFIs do not yet have comprehensive risk 
management systems. The norm in the industry 
appears to consist largely of efforts to manage 
certain types of risk but not the overall risk of the 
institution in a systematic manner. Surprisingly, 
many MFIs seem not to have made a systematic 
effort to manage even credit risk.5 This is evident not 
only in the lack of reliable, accurate, and timely data 
on many MFIs’ loan collection rates and portfolio 
quality, but also in the absence of systematic 
efforts to analyze their loan portfolios from a credit 
risk management point of view. Moreover, many 
MFIs, including those with a number of years of 
operational history, have awfully low risk coverage 
ratios despite having high or moderately high PAR, 
as shown in Table 2.
There appears to be a sharp imbalance in most 
MFIs between their growth plans and the level of 
attention given to the risk management demands 
generated by those growth plans. Most MFIs seem 
to be overly ambitious about their growth plans. 
The growth optimism that prevails in most MFIs 
is further reinforced by their excessive reliance on 
past successes as powerful indicators of the future. 
The past successes seem to have driven many MFIs 
into an overconfident mode about their ability to 
achieve consistently better performance in the 
future. Many MFIs do not seem to fully recognize 
5		 The	effective	management	of	credit	risk	is	critically	important	for	MFIs	because	they	depend	excessively	on	interest	income	
from	loans,	and	loans	are	their	main	asset.	High	administrative	costs	also	make	MFIs	more	vulnerable	to	defaults.
Table 2. Portfolio at risk and risk coverage ratio—(selected Asian MFIs).
  Institution1  Type of Institution (Country)    Portfolio at Risk (PAR)2    Risk Coverage 
        – over 30 days (%)    Ratio (%)3 
      2003  2004  2005  2003  2004  2005
Cantilan	Bank	 Rural	Bank	(Philippines)	 6.2	 13.6	 14.3	 26.2	 21.7	 32.3
ASKI	 NGO	(Philippines)	 14.0	 13.8	 4.3	 28.6	 16.2	 66.3
Bangko	Kabayan	 Rural	Bank	(Philippines)	 –	 5.4	 7.5	 –	 41.5	 27.5
1st	Valley	Bank	 Rural	Bank	(Philippines)	 13.1	 4.8	 4.5	 11.0	 45.0	 61.4
NWTF	 NGO	(Philippines)	 11.8	 4.6	 4.9	 4.0	 7.1	 76.6
Basix	(as	of	31	March)	 Non-bank	finance	company	(India)	 13.0	 8.0	 4.8	 4.8	 9.6	 10.4
Nirdhan	(as	of	31	July)	 Microfinance	bank	(Nepal)	 8.9	 5.5	 10.3	 68.0	 50.7	 25.6
Proshika	 NGO	(Bangladesh)	 14.8	 24.5	 21.6	 56.4	 58.3	 81.3
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the critical role of risk management for the 
successful implementation of their growth plans in 
an increasingly competitive market environment.6  
This factor, more than any others, has contributed to 
inadequacies in risk management in most MFIs.
The microfinance industry has also not made 
much progress on disaster risk management. 
According to Pantoja (2002, p. 30), “disaster risk is 
one of the most critical yet neglected external risks 
faced by MFIs, which for the most part, continue 
to deal with it in an ad hoc manner.” As a result, 
in disaster situations, MFIs become “organizations 
in distress as well as potential instruments of 
recovery” (Nagarajan 1998). However, recent 
disasters such as the 1998 flood in Bangladesh, 
hurricane Mitch in Central America in 1998, and 
the December 2005 tsunami in Asia, among other 
events, have drawn greater attention to the issue of 
disaster risk management. 
The industry experience also tends to suggest 
that inadequate attention to risk management is 
not confined to a particular type of organization 
such as unregulated, primarily credit-only MFIs, 
or small-scale unit banks such as rural banks. 
While regulated microfinance commercial banks 
appear to pay a great deal of attention to systematic 
risk management, the evidence (for example, 
the eventual liquidation of Bank Dagang Bali) 
suggests that even such banks and nonbank 
financial institutions can suffer from significant 
inadequacies.
While inadequacies continue to exist, an 
increasing number of MFIs are making efforts to 
improve some of their risk management practices. 
For example, as compared with about five years 
ago, more MFIs now seem to have comprehensive 
credit manuals, follow more aggressive loan loss 
provisioning policies, and carry out frequent 
detailed analysis of their loan portfolios. An 
increasing number of MFIs have also come to 
realize that the internal audit department plays a 
preeminent role in risk management. 
As Clark (2006, p. 110) noted in respect of 
ACLEDA, as it “grew from a staff of 27 to a staff of 
over 1,000, and from 5 branches to 27, internal audit 
became a prominent feature on the organizational 
chart. The technology and the computerized MIS 
(management information system) made pattern 
recognition possible within a short period of time. 
Financial audit, IT (information technology) audit 
and operations audit are on the ACLEDA internal 
audit department’s menu. Reporting directly to 
the Audit and Risk Committee of the Board, the 
internal audit department works together with each 
department—human resources, credit management, 
marketing, finance, treasury, the IT department, and 
each branch in ACLEDA’s network.”
Some regulated medium- and large-scale 
MFIs such as the SKS Microfinance in India have 
integrated risk management into their institutional 
culture more effectively than most small-scale 
regulated MFIs. Also, a small core group of 
medium- and large-scale NGO-MFIs—consisting 
of flagships, such as the BRAC, ASA, and Buro-
Tangail in Bangladesh, among others—has made 
concerted efforts to improve risk management. 
However, the lack of research on these efforts 
and outcomes makes it difficult to discuss the 
recent improvements in details. It appears that 
risk management has improved in MFIs alongside 
strategic technical or investment links with strong 
networks or for-profit investors. 
Whether the industry has made significant 
progress in addressing risks associated with 
agricultural microfinance is an important question. 
In fact, attempting to answer this question is more 
difficult than assessing the general progress in 
microfinance risk management, for two main 
reasons. First, very little reliable published data 
are available on the agricultural portfolios of MFIs. 
Second, very little research work has been carried 
out on risk management practices used by MFIs in 
respect of agricultural microfinance. The CGAP 
(2005b) research on agricultural microfinance 
activities carried out by few MFIs, however, has 
produced encouraging results. 
The  ACLEDA  Bank,  learning  from  its 
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improvements to managing risks associated with 
agricultural microfinance and other operations. 
Even though the bubble burst in 2001 with respect 
to its balloon loans for agriculture, it did not 
discontinue this service but instead adopted a policy 
to limit the balloon loans to 10% of the branch 
portfolio unless the branch history proves superior 
portfolio quality (Clark 2006, p. 208).7 Some MFIs 
continue to operate successfully despite a heavy 
concentration of their portfolio in agriculture. For 
example, EMT (now AMRET) in Cambodia had 
over 70% of its total portfolio in agriculture at the 
end of 2002. EMT’s PAR over 60 days was only 
0.1%. This agricultural concentration at EMT 
continues. According to the latest rating report 
by M-Cril, AMRET not only had 70% of its total 
portfolio of $9.2 million in agriculture, but also 
had 35% of its portfolio in crop loans at the end of 
June 2005.  The PAR over 60 days as of the same 
date was 0.06%. By the end of 20058, AMRET’s 
total loan portfolio was about $11 million, PAR 
over 30 days 0.07%, write-off ratio 0.03%, and 
risk coverage ratio 773.00%, according to the 
data reported in the MIX Market website (www.
mixmarket.org). 
 
SOME GENERAL PRINCIPLES ON 
MICROFINANCE RISK MANAGEMENT
Based on an examination of current trends 
in microfinance risk management, one general 
observation stands out: Most MFIs pay more attention 
to crisis management than to risk management, and 
the attention to risk management is highly uneven 
across and within MFIs. Given this, MFIs must make 
concerted efforts to put in place comprehensive 
risk management systems appropriate to their 
institutions. Although institutional variations make 
general recommendations less relevant, it is possible 
to outline a number of general principles that MFIs 
need to follow in developing risk management 
systems and procedures.
1.  Risk management must be an integral part of 
the institutional culture, whether an institution 
is an NGO, a nonbank financial institution, a 
specialized MFI, or a cooperative.9  Otherwise, 
many employees would be prone to take 
risk management lightly. It is important to 
inculcate the realization that it would be far 
wiser and more prudent to manage risk than 
to cope with risk, and that risk management 
is a collective and continuous activity which 
engages everyone in an organization in varying 
degrees (Box 3). However, risk management 
should essentially be a top-down activity: it 
should begin at the top of the organization and 
systematically go down to embrace all other 
layers of the organization. 
2.  The one-size-fits-all approach is inappropriate 
for microfinance risk management. In the 
microfinance industry, many MFIs tend to 
adopt measures that other more successful 
or larger MFIs have adopted. While such 
strategies seem to have partly worked in 
developing or introducing new products and 
services and even some delivery models, the 
same strategy cannot be effectively adopted 
for overall risk management primarily because 
of the institution-specificity of the overall risk 
profiles. Hence, each institution must develop 
tailor-made risk management systems and 
procedures appropriate to its own risk profile, 
organizational type, the applicable legal and 
supervisory requirements, scope, scale, and 
complexity of the products and services, service 
delivery modalities used by the institution, and 
the liability structure, among other things. 
3.  A comprehensive approach that covers all types 
of risk to which the institution is exposed, or 
likely to be exposed, is indispensable. The 
system, at a minimum, has to be sufficiently 
forward-looking to accommodate institutional 
growth and social mission objectives for the 
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a comprehensive approach stems from the fact 
that most risks are interrelated. For example, 
the liquidity risk of an MFI could easily lead to 
credit risk if borrowers begin to lose confidence 
in the MFI’s ability to serve their demand for 
loans on a continuing basis. Similarly, credit 
risk may aggravate liquidity risk.
4.  The chief executives and board of directors of 
MFIs must explicitly recognize the potential 
impact of cognitive biases and organizational 
pressures on risks. These two factors could 
easily lead to an executive over-optimism in 
their organizations. Such over-optimism could 
in turn result in the underestimation of potential 
risk, particularly of new initiatives and growth 
strategies.10 
5.  Risk management should not be seen as 
something that must be put in place merely 
to meet the regulatory and supervisory 
requirements of financial authorities. Risk 
management needs to be seen more as a 
critically important way to ensure financial 
soundness, operational efficiency, growth, 
and stability of the institution to achieve its 
mission. Thus, those MFIs that are not subject 
to prudential regulation must also have an 
appropriate risk management system and 
procedures.
6.  It is important to recognize that risk management 
is not the management of financial ratios based 
on balance sheets and income statements. 
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in an effective risk management system, a 
comprehensive system goes well beyond 
those.
7.  MFIs need to consider risk management not 
as an activity to which attention needs to be 
paid periodically but as a continuing process 
to which unbroken and unwavering attention 
is required as an integral part of their daily 
operations. 
8.  The primary responsibility for putting in place 
an effective risk management system and 
procedures must rest with the board of directors 
and the chief executive officer of an MFI; 
the board and the chief executive, in addition 
to others, must also share implementation 
responsibilities. The direct link between 
governance and risk management must also 
be recognized.
9.  Some  elements  of  risk  management  in 
microfinance must go well beyond one’s own 
institutional boundaries and must include, to 
the extent possible, measures that would help 
the MFI clients to manage their risks more 
effectively. This is one of the fundamental 
differences between risk management in 
conventional financial institutions and MFIs. 
For some MFIs, such measures may include 
financial literacy programs and basic health 
education for the clients. Three factors justify 
such wider measures: (i) poor households 
suffer from multiple disadvantages which 
prevent them from fully utilizing their access 
to financial services, (ii) most MFIs provide 
loans without collateral and run greater risk if 
their client households’ economic activities do 
not perform as expected, and (iii) MFIs have a 
social mission. 
10.  Risk  management  practices  should  be 
market-oriented. For example, some MFIs 
have attempted to manage their credit and 
competition risks through a memorandum of 
understanding with their potential competitors 
while others (NWTF is an example) have asked 
their borrowers/members for a commitment 
not to shift to the competitors. These are not 
market-oriented practices.
11.  A comprehensive risk management system 
must include a “feedback loop” (Figure 1) from 
the highest to the lowest levels of the MFI, 
often including the board of directors, among 




As argued earlier, MFIs involved or planning 
to increase their involvement in agricultural 
microfinance must pay much greater attention 
to risk management than others. Some recent 
developments in many rural economies have 
probably increased further the risk in agricultural 
operations. Dismantling guaranteed prices for many 
farm products and liberalizing trade have generally 
led to declines in farm output prices. In many 
countries, the cost of production in small-holder 
agriculture may have increased, thus reducing the 
profit margins from farming. Agricultural production 
in many developing countries are also moving more 
toward high-value crops for which scale economies 
are more important to take advantage of the new 
markets and marketing arrangements. In terms of 
responding to this increased demand for high-value 
crops,  poor households often find themselves at 
a relatively disadvantaged position vis-à-vis the 
nonpoor farm households. 
However, at the same time, other factors may 
have had a positive impact on the prospects of 
agricultural microfinance. For example, most rural 
households today are pluriactive and have nonfarm 
sources of income due to the significant economic 
transformation that has taken place in many rural 
economies. According to the Rural Asia study of 
ADB (2000), the rural non-farm economy accounts 
for 20–40% of total rural employment, and 25–50% 
of total rural income in Asia. In East Laguna in the 
Philippines, the share of nonfarm income in total 
household income had increased from 13 % to 64%, 
according to some studies (Rigg 2006, p. 183). A 
similar picture of rural economic diversification and 
a progressive shift from farm to nonfarm livelihoods 
is evident in the Central Plains of Thailand (Rigg 
2006, p. 183). 
A survey of rural households in 240 villages 
across 16 states in India showed that during the 
period 1971–1999, the share of nonfarm incomes 
in total rural incomes rose from 19% to 48% 
(Foster and Rosenzweig 2004, pp. 517–518). 
In many countries, many poor farm households 
are essentially part-time rather than full-time 16 Asian Journal of Agriculture and Development, Vol. 4, No. 2
farmers. These households are less vulnerable to 
external shocks than those depending exclusively 
on agriculture and pose significantly lower levels 
of risk to the lenders. In this context, it may be 
possible to argue that although the agricultural 
operations of poor households may have become 
more risky in recent times, the risk in agricultural 
microfinance may have declined due to the 
significant diversification of the sources of income 
of many rural households engaged in agriculture, 
among other things. But risks have not disappeared 
from agricultural microfinance.
Although  agricultural  microfinance  is 
more risky and difficult than nonagricultural 
microfinance, a small number of MFIs seem to 
have been engaged in agricultural microfinance 
with relatively encouraging results. Their collective 
as well as individual experiences make it possible 
to suggest some general principles and strategies 
from a risk management point of view, which MFIs 
would do well to consider when planning to either 
venture into agricultural microfinance or merely 
increase their current involvement in agricultural 
financing.
1.  It is difficult, if not impossible, for an individual 
MFI to change the external environment in 
which the agricultural economy operates. 
Hence, the most fundamental principle that 
MFIs must follow is to take this external 
environment as more or less given when making 
plans for entry into agricultural microfinance. 
This implies that MFIs must look primarily into 
their internal capacity to handle agricultural 
microfinance.11 MFIs with weak internal 
























Figure 1: Risk management feedback loop
Source:	Reproduced	from	(GTZ	2000,	p.	36).17 Nimal A. Fernando
should not consider agricultural microfinance 
until such internal capacity is built.
2.  Adopting specific limits on the share of 
agricultural loans at institutional and branch 
levels are important. Over time, branches 
should be allowed to gradually increase their 
agricultural loans to this limit based on the 
quality of the portfolio and the adequacy of 
needed human resources. ACLEDA Bank 
adopted this method with impressive results 
and has been able to expand its involvement 
in agricultural microfinance in recent years. 
Successful MFIs do not lend only to agriculture 
and most set a limit to the share of their 
agricultural portfolio (Gonzalez-Vega 2003, 
p. 60).
3.  Increasing  the  degree  of  diversity  of 
agricultural lending can be accomplished, for 
one, by lending to a wide variety of farming 
households, including clients engaged in more 
than one crop or livestock activity (CGAP 
2005a). Another way would be to finance 
the farming operations of households with 
diverse sources of income. This is one of the 
strategies that the Caja Los Andes (now Banco 
Los Andes ProCredit) in Bolivia adopted. 
Efforts to achieve geographical diversification 
of agricultural lending to reduce exposure to 
possible covariant risks are essential.
4.  Human resource capabilities required to carry 
out agricultural microfinance need to be built. 
Credit officers need to be equipped with special 
training in agricultural credit appraisal and 
management before embarking on a program 
to expand agricultural financing. MFIs are 
advised not to assign responsibility for 
agricultural financing to new staff or staff with 
inadequate field experience and knowledge 
of farming operations.12 As the experience 
of many farm credit institutions bear out,   
collection difficulties have arisen because 
they had adopted unrealistic assumptions in 
credit analysis to begin with and did not make 
risk-based adjustments in the forecasts of crop 
yields and prices. In addition to cognitive biases 
in decision-making, such deficient practices 
reflect the lack of knowledge of farming 
conditions and inadequate or inappropriate 
training. Successful agricultural lending 
requires credit analysts to take into account 
worst-case scenarios and forecasts about future 
conditions likely to affect the production and 
price outcomes, among other things, rather 
than relying on unrealistic “normal year” 
assumptions (Von-Pischke 2003; 1991; 
1989).13  Caja Los Andes employs loan officers 
with thorough knowledge of agricultural 
inputs, risks, and business models and local 
culture. Loan officers are thoroughly trained in 
lending methodology before they undergo on-
the-job training under the close supervision of 
a branch manager for at least one year. Calpiá 
in El Salvador (now Banco ProCredit) has also 
adopted a similar approach to human resource 
development for agricultural finance (Navajas 
and Gonzales-Vega 2003). 
5.  MFIs need to make agricultural credit decisions 
including decisions on loan sizes, based 
on the household debt capacity14  rather 
than the expected surpluses of the loan-
financed agricultural investment. Caja Los 
Andes in Bolivia (CGAP 2005a) and Banco 
ProCredit El Salvador, for example, use 
this practice. The entire household’s ability 
and willingness to repay is assessed and 
loan amounts and repayment schedules 
are determined accordingly, based on the 
household cash flow that incorporates all 
revenue and expenses of the entire household 
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capacity, particular attention needs to be paid 
to possible “senior claims.”15  Neglect of this 
may lead to an overestimation of the ability to 
repay a loan. And overloading a borrower with 
debt is one way to ensure poor loan collection 
performance.
6.  It is important to tailor loan disbursements, 
recovery of loan installments, and loan 
maturities to suit the borrower-household’s 
corresponding crop cycle and cash flow 
pattern rather than to the institution’s own 
convenience. This would mean that an MFI 
may offer different disbursement and recovery 
plans. Most MFIs with a relatively successful 
track record in agricultural microfinance adopt 
such flexible disbursement and recovery plans. 
Depending on the client’s requirements, some 
MFIs offer two or three periodic disbursements 
with periodic interest payments and one 
balloon payment of the principal, while some 
others offer irregular disbursements and 
repayment facilities tailored to the cash flow 
pattern of the household (CGAP 2005c, p. 2). 
If MFIs have loans for agriculture with balloon 
repayment facility, they need to pay more 
attention to those loans even if borrowers pay 
interest on a regular basis. This is an important 
lesson that ACLEDA Bank learned from its 
2001 delinquency crisis.16  However, regular 
repayment schedules are possible even with 
agricultural microcredit when households have 
other cash flow sources.
7.  If an MFI is planning to engage in agricultural 
microfinance in an area which had been 
polluted by failed subsidized programs in the 
past, putting in place a comprehensive strategy 
to develop a credit culture that respects loan 
repayment obligations is absolutely essential. 
A hard stance on repayments, as reflected 
in a established reputation for not tolerating 
delinquency, can have a profound impact 
on perceptions and habits that many farm 
households may have on loan repayment, 
thereby reducing the credit risk. Calpiá in El 
Salvador and Banco Los Andes ProCredit 
(formerly Caja Los Andes) in Bolivia adopted 
such strategies. 
8.  It would be useful to establish and rely on 
meaningful partnerships and alliances with 
organizations involved in the value chain 
relevant to the farming activities that would 
be financed. Such partnerships and alliances 
will reduce information asymmetries and 
transaction costs and improve the timeliness 
of service provision, thus reducing overall risk 
associated with agricultural lending.
9.  Agricultural lending must be combined with 
deposit and other financial services as much 
as possible. Deposit services enable a lender 
to gather valuable information about the farm 
households to which it extends loans while 
deposits help the households to build liquidity 
that can be used for lean times. If MFIs are able 
to link lending and deposit services to incoming 
remittance flows to the households, their ability 
to manage agricultural microfinance risk will 
further improve.
10.  It is important to rely on weather-based 
agricultural insurance as much as possible. 
Basix in India has been making an attempt to 
do this. And India’s ICICI Bank is also another 
institution which makes an effort to use this 
modality to reduce risks inherent in lending to 
agriculture. The Centenary Rural Development 
Bank in Uganda offers weather insurance17 to 
its clients to hedge against correlated risks from 
natural disasters (Skees 2003, p. 25). However, 
given that microinsurance itself is a risky 
business and any insurer unable to reach large 
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position, MFIs should consider playing the role 
of an agent of corporate insurers in providing 
this kind of insurance (Churchill 2006).
11.  Providing loans for building assets could reduce 
inherent risks in agricultural microfinance. 
Examples are loans extended to install rooftop 
water harvesting mechanisms or construct 
wells for irrigation. Some MFIs in South 
Asia provide such loans. While such loans 
themselves involve risks for the lender, they 
also can potentially lower lender’s risk in the 
medium to long term.
CONCLUSIONS 
The microfinance industry has experienced 
dramatic growth during the last two decades, in 
general, and the last decade, in particular. The next 
decade will most probably see a continuation of this 
growth. Such growth is not only sought by many 
MFIs but also needed in most countries because 
the unserved and underserved markets continue to 
remain large. However, pursuit of growth—in terms 
of breadth, depth, and scope of outreach—does 
not mean that MFIs can ignore risk management. 
In contrast, risk management has become more 
important now than it was ten years ago, and its 
importance will continue to grow in the future. 
Other factors such as the increasing competition 
in markets and the integration of new technology 
into the industry further reinforce the importance 
of microfinance risk management. The growing 
interest of MFIs in agricultural microfinance further 
reinforces the importance of risk management in 
MFIs.
However, it is disturbing to note that systematic 
risk management is still not as widespread as it 
should be. The increased emphasis on microfinance 
risk management at the level of international 
promoters of microfinance has not yet had its full 
impact on most institutions at the retail level. 
Many MFIs do not seem to pay adequate 
attention to systematic risk management. Many 
continue to seek growth without much attention to 
attendant risks. Even basic credit risk management, 
upon which the industry’s growth prospects have 
been built historically, is neglected by many MFIs. 
The tendency to attribute institutional setbacks to 
external factors appears to continue. Many small- 
and medium-scale MFIs tend to focus their resources 
on crisis management partly on the assumption that 
it is the same as risk management. 
The growing interests of many MFIs in 
agricultural microfinance must also be seen in this 
context to understand the real issues involved in 
agriculture microfinance and whether MFIs should 
be concerned more about their internal structures 
and capabilities rather than the widely discussed, 
and often cited, pervasive risks in agriculture and 
their ramifications for MFIs’ pursuit of growth in 
agricultural portfolios. 
MFIs should recognize the inherent risks 
in agriculture. However, if they build their 
institutional capacity to effectively deal with risks 
generally associated with financial intermediation, 
this would significantly increase their prospects 
for success in agricultural microfinance. Thus, 
risk management should be high on the agenda of 
senior management. 
While there are many cases of risk management 
failures across countries and different types of 
MFIs, many MFIs seem to ignore the possibility that 
they might be confronted with similar difficulties. 
MFIs must abandon this attitude of complacency 
or indifference, if they are to make progress. In the 
meantime, given the paucity of high quality data 
and information on MFI risk management systems 
and practices, promoting research programs in 
risk management and in agricultural microfinance 
would be immensely valuable. Such research 
could significantly contribute to advancing the 
discussions on risk management in microfinance, 
including agricultural microfinance and generate 
valuable insights for MFIs to improve their risk 
management systems and exposure to agricultural 
financing.
It is also necessary to recognize the value of 
learning from past mistakes in the industry. This 
is particularly important because such learning 
does not appear to be currently taking place on 
a systematic basis. To facilitate such learning, 
both regulators and other industry stakeholders, 
including MFIs themselves, should seriously 
consider measures to develop a centralized 
risk information facility while simultaneously 
complying with the confidentiality of information 
between competing institutions.
No amount of sophisticated and modern 
technical tools and analysis will be able to help 
achieve effective risk management in respect of 20 Asian Journal of Agriculture and Development, Vol. 4, No. 2
nonagricultural or agricultural microfinance if risk 
management is not embedded into the institutional 
culture and its value is not shared by all employees. 
This remains to be one of the most challenging 
tasks of risk management which an MFI should 
accomplish. 
To help address this issue, we need to bring 
into the discussion the institutional cultural issues 
and issues related to cognitive biases in executive 
decision-making behavior, especially given the 
current focus on the introduction of sophisticated 
systems and technical tools of risk management.
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